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Abstract 
 
The growth of socially responsible investment on public financial markets has drawn 
considerable academic attention over the last decade. Discarding from previous literature, this 
paper sets up to analyze the Private Equity channel, which is shown to have the potentiality to 
foster sustainable practices in unlisted companies. The fast integration of the Environmental, 
Social and Governance issues by mainstream Private Equity investors is unveiled and appears 
to have benefited from the maturation of socially responsible investment on public financial 
markets and the impetus of large conventional actors. Hypothesis on the characteristics and 
drivers of this movement are proposed and tested on a unique database covering the French 
Private Equity industry in 2011. Empirical findings support that Private Equity responsible 
investing is characterized by shareholder activism and strategically driven by a need for new 
value creation sources, increased risk management and differentiation. In particular, results 
show that independent funds, which need to attract investors, are more likely than captive 
funds to develop responsible practices. Evolution of the movement and future research paths 
are proposed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is an investment process that integrates social, 
environmental, and ethical considerations into investment decision making (Renneboog et al., 
2008). As such, it differs from conventional investments in a twofold way. First, socially 
responsible investors apply a set of investment screens to select or exclude assets based on 
non-financial criteria, in addition to financial criteria.  Second, those investors often engage in 
shareholder activism to foster Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies in the firms 
they own. Over the last decade, the SRI market has kept expanding, reaching in 2010 about 3 
070 billion USD in the United States, representing 12.2% of assets under management (Social 
Investment Forum, 2010) and 3 800 billion EUR in Europe in 2010 (Eurosif, 2010). SRI 
markets are also expanding in Canada (EIA, 2005), Australia (SIO, 2004) and Asia (ASRIA, 
2011). 
Consequently, SRI structure, performance and evolution triggered research in management, 
economics and finance fields. However, most academic work focuses on SRI provided on 
public financial markets. The potential impact of the Private Equity channel on a firm‟s non 
financial policies and performance has received less attention (Scholtens, 2006; Cumming and 
Johan, 2007), partly because it is still at its early steps. Discarding from previous literature, 
this paper unveils responsible investment practices among Private Equity investors and their 
specificities compared to both standard Private Equity and public markets‟ SRI. Light is shed 
on their surprisingly fast integration of Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria 
and drivers of this movement are empirically analyzed in the French context.  
Here, the term “Private Equity” industry refers to specialized investment firms whose 
business is to invest in unlisted companies, thus encompassing both venture capital and 
buyouts. On a theoretical level, Private Equity has been identified as highly efficient at 
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maximizing shareholders‟ value by reducing agency costs and providing strong incentive to 
management (e.g. Jensen 1986, 1989; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). As such, combining 
extra-financial and financial consideration through corporate social responsibility does not 
appear in direct line with Private Equity investors‟ practices as it would amount to spend cash 
flows to provide public good. In fact, on an empirical level, the phenomenal growth curve of 
the Private Equity industry in Europe and the United States over the 2000-2007 period drew 
media and regulatory concerns about its effect on business and society. In particular, buyouts 
have been pointed out for their potentially negative social impact (Financial Services 
Authority, 2006; Bocquet Report, 2007).  
Hereby, the question of the characterization of a socially responsible investment movement in 
Private Equity is by far not trivial and the analysis of its drivers is challenging both 
empirically and theoretically. The pioneering work of Cumming and Johan (2007), first to 
consider the direct intersection between SRI and Private Equity, analyzes the factors that 
influence institutional investors to allocate capital to socially responsible Private Equity 
investments. The authors forecast an increasing demand by institutional investors to invest 
responsibly and call for further research on the factors that give rise to fund managers offering 
such investment alternatives to their investors. 
This paper hence sets up to analyze the responsible investment movement in Private Equity. 
First, it establishes that the industry benefited from the maturation of SRI on public financial 
markets. In particular, the Private Equity approach of SRI appears to be a mainstream 
approach initiated by large conventional players. Hypothesis on the characteristics and drivers 
of the responsible investment movement in Private Equity are econometrically tested with 
multivariate analysis on a unique database covering the French Private Equity industry, third 
world largest after the United States and the United Kingdom. Main findings are that SRI in 
Private Equity is characterized by shareholder activism and strategically driven by a need for 
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new value creation sources, increased risk management and differentiation. In particular, 
results show that independent funds, which need to attract investors, are more likely than 
captive funds to develop responsible practices.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines and provides historical 
insights on SRI and Private Equity to establish where this industry stands in terms of 
responsible practices. Section 3 builds testable hypothesis. Section 4 presents data. Section 5 
displays results. Main findings are discussed in section 6 as well as the potential evolution of 
the socially responsible Private Equity movement in light of the upcoming regulatory context. 
Section 7 concludes on potential further research paths. 
 
2. PRIVATE EQUITY AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT: WHERE DO WE 
STAND? 
As a starting point, this section briefly reviews the parallel development of the SRI concept on 
the one hand and of the Private Equity industry on the other hand, hence contextualizing the 
integration of responsible investment in Private Equity.  
 
2.1. The Socially Responsible Investment concept, from margin to mainstream 
SRI involves two main approaches. The first consists in using screens to either avoid 
(negative screening) or seek out (positive screening) specific investments when building a 
portfolio. Screens can be ethical, normative (based on social or environmental international 
norms), sectoral or best-in-class (selecting most CSR proactive firms, whatever their sector). 
The second main SRI approach is engagement or shareholder activism: shareholders‟ voting 
rights are used to directly foster CSR in portfolio companies. Both approaches share the 
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integration of a consideration of ESG issues in investment practices. Eccles and Viviers 
(2011) add to this definition that this integration be done “with the primary purpose of 
delivering higher-risk-adjusted financial returns”. 
Such has not always been the case, as illustrated in Renneboog et al. (2008)‟s review of the 
SRI maturation from the 17th century Quakers ideology to nowadays. The authors date back 
to 1971 the creation of the first modern SRI mutual fund, the Pax World Fund, for United 
States investors opposed to the Vietnam War and militarism. In the 1980's, United States and 
European SRI investors focused on exerting pressure on companies doing business in South 
Africa during the racist apartheid. Issues like environmental protection, human rights, and 
labor relations were introduced in the 1990‟s, parallel to the growth of ethical consumerism 
that environmental and industrial disasters enhanced. Renneboog et al. (2008) end this 
chronology with the 2000's focus on corporate governance, transparency and responsibility, 
grounded in a series of corporate scandals.  
Beyond the enlargement of the SRI content, the 2000‟s were also the years of the SRI shift 
from a marginal niche market to a mainstream practice, a phenomenon called „SRI 
mainstreaming‟ and based on the progressive penetration of SRI (extra financial) criteria into 
conventional investment funds focused on financial criteria only (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004; 
Bourghelle et al., 2009). Dunfee (2003) concludes that SRI has the potential to become a 
mainstream phenomenon practiced by ordinary investors. Louche and Lydenberg (2006) 
precise that this movement is likelier is the European that in the United States‟ financial 
landscape. Indeed, Crifo and Mottis (2011) and Arjalies (2010) show that this potential has 
been realized by assets managers in the French market. More specifically, Arjalies (2010) 
argues that SRI has developed in France in the late 1990‟s as a result of a deliberative and 
organized social movement, which aimed at changing the institutional logics of the asset 
management field. The legislative context also mattered for the development of long term 
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investing and SRI in France and potentially the emergence of SRI mainstreaming: creation of 
a Pension trust Fund (Fonds de Reserve des Retraites) in 2001 with a specific SRI policy, 
Laws on Employee Savings in 2001 and 2003 promoting long term investing , New Economic 
Regulation Act in 2001 and Grenelle 2 Act in 2011 introducing compulsory responsibility 
reporting for listed and non listed firms (Crifo and Mottis, 2011). 
 
2.2. The surge and crisis of the Private Equity industry 
Parallel to the development of the SRI market but on a whole different scale, Private Equity 
witnessed a striking growth curve over 2000s, until the financial crisis. To grasp the economic 
role of those investors and how responsible investment can fit in their practices, let us first 
describe their business. 
Private Equity holds a key role in our economies because it finances innovation and unlisted 
companies, most of them being small and medium size enterprises. As put by the French 
National Economic Analysis Center: “Thousands of Medium Size Enterprises, which make up 
a large share of our country‟s productive structure, do not have today, and will even less have 
tomorrow, any other financing source than Private Equity” (Glachant et al., 2008). 
Indeed, Private Equity acts as financial intermediary between investors (the “Limited 
Partners”) and companies. A limited partnership links the Private Equity firm, who acts as 
“General Partners” and manages the fund, to the Limited Partners who provide the capital. 
Limited Partners neither manage the funds they invest in nor intervene at the investee 
company level, yet they regularly assess the quality of the investments made by General 
Partners. Typically, Limited Partners are institutional investors (banks, insurance companies 
and pension funds) but also count family offices, individuals, corporations and Government 
agencies. Private Equity funds exist for a fixed period (usually 10 years) over which the 
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General Partners acquires companies, generate cash, and sell them to redistribute capital and 
dividends to the Limited Partners. Private Equity investors are thus significant or majority 
shareholders of companies for 4 to 7 years. Depending on the growth stage on the company 
and the complexity of the deal (Morrell and Clark, 2010), the industry can be broken down in 
different segments. Venture capital usually invest in younger companies in innovative or 
technological industries as minority shareholders. Buyouts target larger companies in more 
mature industries and encompass Growth capital, Transmission Capital and Distressed Capital 
depending on the company stage and needs. Leveraged buyouts (LBO), most common in 
Transmission Capital, are specific deals in which a small share of equity is invested and 
leveraged by a large acquisition debt.  
The surge of Private Equity financing first occurred in the United States over the 1980s, a 
decade of intense corporate restructuring in the face of international competition and 
deregulation (Jensen, 1993). It was driven by LBO and often relying on junk bond financing. 
As the junk bond market crashed, many LBO defaulted and investee companies went to 
bankruptcy, so that the Private Equity industry nearly disappeared in the early 1990‟s (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2009). However, remaining Private Equity funds acted as a substitute for 
weak capital markets over the 1994-2004 period (Boucly et al., 2009) and the industry 
underwent a steady growth. In 2001, venture capital investments were almost 100 times larger 
than they were in 1977, whereas bank lending to small firms stayed constant at the best over 
the same period (Ueda, 2004). The 2000s thus witnessed a new boom of the Private Equity 
and LBO peaked in the 2006-2007 due to a period of euphoric credit markets (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2009).  
The 2008 financial crisis led fundraising and debt markets to plummet and ended the Private 
Equity surge (Figure 1). From then on, competition rocketed up and returns had to 
increasingly come from value creation, such as selecting underdeveloped companies and 
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accelerating their growth, rather than financial leverage effect (Boucly et al., 2009). Price 
competition and consequent quest for value creation had nevertheless started prior to the 
crisis, as shown by Jin and Wang (2002) and Gaspar (2009). This paper conjectures that 
responsible investing practices are part of this value creation quest. 
 
FIGURE 1. French Private Equity market (data AFIC 2011 and UN PRI 2011) in amounts of funds 
raised, funds invested and UN PRI signatories. 
 
 
2.3. Integration of responsible practices by Private Equity investors 
The official intersection of Private Equity and SRI can be dated back to 2009, a period of 
liquidity dearth. Indeed, the first major move towards responsible investment in Private 
Equity was the adoption (February 10, 2009) of guidelines covering environmental, health, 
safety, labor, governance and social issues by large conventional players, namely the United 
States Private Equity Council, representing 13 of the world‟s largest Private Equity investors. 
Within a month, the Private Equity United Nations Principles for Responsible Investing (UN 
PRI) were launched and its Board stated (March 2009):  
"We also need to recognize that investors can, and should, be part of the response to this crisis 
and that responsible investment has an important role in mitigating future such market 
failures.(...). This crisis demonstrated a clear lack of understanding of our underlying 
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investments, and how they may have been putting not only the companies involved at risk, but 
the entire economy.” 
Between February 2009 and August 2011, 107 Private Equity companies became UN PRI 
signatories, among which world leaders funds of funds and General Partners. National 
associations are major actors in this change, as witnessed by the Australian Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association asking its members to “seriously consider signing the UN PRI” 
in August 2009 or the responsible investing guidelines provided in June 2010 by the British 
Association. In France, the Sustainable Development Project of the French Association for 
Private Equity (AFIC) was launched in April 2010 by conventional Private Equity firms. Key 
figures also encourage the SRI movement in Private Equity, such as Lord Mandelson, the 
United Kingdom secretary of state for business, innovation and skills, who emphasized that 
embracing CSR issues into Private Equity investment approach made “good business sense” 
(September 2009).  
Henceforth, SRI in Private Equity can be conjectured as a mainstream approach initiated by 
large players and structurally neither thought of nor developed as a niche market. Typically, 
socially responsible Private Equity hence essentially differs from conventional Private Equity 
in that it integrates ESG issues in its investing practices. 
Let us finally note that despite its quick evolution, SRI in Private Equity is still at its first 
steps. The UN PRI estimate that the share of total Private Equity market share subject to 
integration by PRI signatories worldwide was 5% in 2009 and 8% in 2011. As about 10% of 
the AFIC members are UNPRI signatories, France appears as an active and interesting field to 
investigate in details the SRI movement in Private Equity. Private equity and venture capital 
funds  
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3. TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS ON CHARACTERISTICS AND DRIVERS OF THE 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT MOVEMENT IN PRIVATE EQUITY 
Whereas socially responsible Private Equity differs from conventional Private Equity by its 
integration of ESG issues, does it presents specificities compared to SRI on financial markets? 
This section builds testable hypothesis on the characteristics of socially responsible Private 
Equity and respectively its strategic and responsive drivers.  
 
3.1. Hypothesis on the Characteristics of Socially Responsible Private Equity 
A straightforward conjecture is that difference between SRI on financial markets and socially 
responsible Private Equity might directly arise from the specificities of Private Equity itself. 
Drawing from the corporate finance literature, four characteristics of Private Equity are hence 
here detailed: information asymmetry reduction; governance engineering; agency costs cut; 
and operational engineering. Impacts on ESG criteria integration are conjectured and lead to 
testable hypothesis.  
First, asymmetric information between informed managers and the public market has been 
shown to cause under-investment in Myers and Majluf (1984)‟ seminal paper. Private Equity 
investors reduce this information asymmetry by monitoring the companies they select 
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and evaluating them better than a standard financial institution 
would (Ueda, 2004). Empirical evidence is found that Private Equity investors acquire 
companies lower than other bidders and sell them high (Acharya and Kehol, 2008). Therefore 
Private Equity investors either succeed in identifying under-valued companies or at taking 
advantage of market timing (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). Analyzing ESG during 
acquisition stages and due diligence process provide new information to improve monitoring 
and comprehensively assess assets. As such, ESG integration appears as another tool to 
reduce information asymmetry and improve business.  
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Second, governance engineering has been shown to be another Private Equity strength 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). Private Equity investors usually have significant impact (if not 
complete control) on portfolio company board and are much more involved in governance 
than public companies board. For instance, it is not unusual that they initiate a management 
change. Managing governance issues is thus already core in Private Equity business. Hereby, 
the gap between managing “G” to full “ESG” issues is more easily filled in by Private Equity 
investors than public investors. 
The following hypothesis on characteristics of responsible investment in Private Equity is 
thus proposed: 
 H1: Responsible Private Equity firms tend to integrate ESG issues in mainstream 
business, rather than considering it as a niche market segment. 
 
Third, the agency theory framework has been applied to the Private Equity setting by Jensen 
(1986, 1989), leading to the free cash flow hypothesis. Jensen argues that managers in 
companies with excess cash flows have an incentive to waste organizational resources on 
personal ends, rather than pay out the excess cash to shareholders through dividends. 
However financing by equity investors lead to high debt level (particularly for leverage 
buyouts) which affect the free cash flows of the firm for debt servicing, preventing 
opportunistic behaviors of managers. The hypothesis has been empirically validated since 
(Ambrose and Winters, 1992; Opler and Titman, 1993; Desbrières and Schatt, 2002). Private 
Equity tight hand on agency costs will naturally lead investors to carefully consider CSR in 
their portfolio companies, since  CSR has also been pointed out as a waste of slack resources 
for managers who like the accolades of environmentalists or try to develop entrenchment 
strategies as an insurance against poor economic performance (Baron et al., 2009; Cespa and 
Cestone, 2007). Being a socially responsible Private Equity investor means fostering CSR in 
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portfolio companies while reducing agency costs. To succeed to do so, investors needs to be 
well informed of managerial decisions and closely involved in strategic changes. Engagement 
thus appears a necessity to consistently be a socially responsible Private Equity investor.  
Moreover, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) argue that a property of Private Equity investors is 
operational engineering. Typically, Private Equity firms possess industry and operational 
expertise by their choice of human capital. They are thus able to advise companies at the core 
of their business to enhance value creation. Distinguishing value-creation CSR from 
managerial entrenchment requires a sound understanding of the firm environment and 
markets, which Private Equity possesses. The following hypothesis on characteristics of 
responsible investment in Private Equity is thus proposed: 
 H2: Responsible Private Equity relies on shareholder activism rather than screening. 
 
Nevertheless, understanding CSR potentiality needs sound expertise. Indeed, CSR 
encompasses many dimensions, some being complements and other substitutes (Cavaco and 
Crifo, 2010); some being linearly linked to profitability and other having optimum (Forget, 
2011). Yet expertise on strategic CSR is still scarce, all the more considering the recent 
interest of the industry for ESG issues. It is thus more likely for large Private Equity firms 
benefitting from wide human capital resources to be able to appropriately acquire CSR 
expertise. It can thus be conjectured that large Private Equity firms are more likely to engage 
in responsible investment practices. 
 H3: Responsible practices are more likely to be implemented in large Private Equity 
firms in terms of workforce. 
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3.2. Hypothesis on Strategic Drivers of Responsible Private Equity 
The idea of strategic ESG integration refers to the reconciliation of social and long term 
economic interests of corporations. Experts in profit maximization, Private Equity investors 
seem likely to opportunistically analyze CSR as a strategic resource to improve the bottom 
line performance of companies (McWilliams et al., 2006). In their survey, Cumming and 
Johan (2007) indeed find that socially responsible institutional investment programs are more 
common among investors expecting greater economic returns from those investments. Porter 
and Kramer (2006) also provide strong evidence that it is through strategic CSR that the 
company will make the most significant social impact and reap the greatest business benefits.  
The following potential strategic drivers for responsible Private Equity are identified: value-
creation; risk management; new market creation; differentiation and related compliance to 
Limited Partners demand. 
 
3.2.1. Hypothesis on Value creation as a strategic driver 
Can a Private Equity fund creates value by integrating ESG criteria in investment practices? If 
investors believed so, then responsible investing would be grounded in profit-maximization. 
Let us briefly review arguments in favor of such a belief. 
As a starting point, empirical comparisons of public SRI performance to standard portfolios 
lead to rather lukewarm results, the former either achieving similar or lower yields than the 
latter (Statman, 2000; Bauer et al., 2002; Kreander et al., 2005). Cowton (2004) argues that it 
is theoretically very difficult for SRI investments to outperform on average, because anything 
a SRI fund can do, so too can a non-SRI fund. Jones et al. (2008) also find SRI 
underperformance and ground it in the additional transaction costs and management fees 
generally associated with SRI screening. Recent work suggests that whereas SRI underwent a 
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learning period in which it underperformed standard portfolio, it since caught up with 
conventional funds performance (Climent and Soriano, 2011).  
However, as previously underlined, Private Equity investors structurally differ from public 
investors. Beyond governance and operating engineering, they typically do not build large and 
diversified portfolios based on modern portfolio theory but rather select and follow a few 
companies in which they are significant active shareholders over a long period. Value creation 
in the Private Equity context should thus rather be analyzed through the lens of the link 
between CSR and financial performance than SRI versus standards portfolios.  
This link has elicited much interest over the last three decades. Recent literature reviews 
(Orlitzky et al., 2003; Portney, 2008; Reinhardt et al., 2008; Margolis et al., 2009; Forget, 
2010) converge to a consensus on the absence of a financial penalty associated with CSR. Yet 
generating over-performance with proactive CSR does not come straightforward, leading 
academics to advocate research on how corporations can succeed in both performing on social 
and financial levels. Reviews also highlight that value can be created though different 
channels. 
First, anchored in Porter‟s hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995), increased input-
output efficiency can provide a competitive advantage. In this line, Derwall et al. (2005) find 
a positive link between eco-efficiency and financial performance. Such a potentiality has 
already been grasped by Private Equity investors. For instance, the giant Private Equity firm 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) developed with the help of the NGO Environmental Defence 
Fund a Green Portfolio Program in which tools are implemented to reduce the portfolio 
companies‟ environmental impact. The Program now involves 16 companies, making up 20% 
of its total global portfolio. In 2009, KKR estimated results at $160 million avoided costs and 
345,000 metric tons of CO2, 1.2 million tons of waste, and 8,500 tons of paper use avoided 
with green initiatives. A second channel is the reduction of costly employee turnover and the 
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recruitment of motivated, hence more productive, employees (Turban and Greening, 1997; 
Brekke and Nyborg, 2007). Understanding potential gains, the French restaurant chain Léon 
financed by OFI Private Equity improved its social policy and reduced employee turnover 
from 102% to 38% from 2002 to 2009 (AFIC Sustainable Club, 2010). Finally, CSR might 
answer consumers‟ demand and increase companies reputation, leading to long-term 
increased brand and company values. Kanter (1999), Porter and Kramer (2002) and Kotler 
and Lee (2005) support that CSR can improve reputation and consumer loyalty and are thus 
good for business from a marketing perspective. The Private Equity firm Blackstone (935 
billion USD under management in 2009) supports this argument while promoting energy 
efficiency in the Hilton Hotels, which it claims saved 15 to 20 million USD in 2008. Portney 
(2008) precises that it might be particularly true for firms in the food and consumer products 
businesses, as is the case of the Hilton Hotels and Léon.  
Hereby a strong rationale backs up the belief in value potentially created with improved ESG 
management, even though it requires sound expertise. The following hypothesis is thus 
proposed. 
 
Hypotheses on strategic value creation: 
 H4: Responsible practices in Private Equity are motivated by creating value in 
portfolio companies. 
 
3.2.2. Hypothesis on Risk management as a strategic driver 
Another strategic rationale for promoting CSR in portfolio companies is improved risk 
management. As the company‟s cash flow is used to service the acquisition debt, Private 
Equity investors‟ greater risk is that the company will not achieve the cash flow necessary (Le 
Nadant and Perdreau, 2006). This is particularly crucial in the case of leveraged buyout 
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transactions, in which investors are hence most interested in the company‟s future capacity to 
generate large and steady levels of cash flow. Hereby risk analysis, including ESG risks, are 
core to Private Equity business. Principle 1 of the UN PRI is thus “about better analysis of risk” 
and “calls for the integration of a broader range of environmental, social and governance 
issues into investment processes”. 
 
Scholtens (2006) identifies three specific risks particularly associated with ESG management 
default. A first direct risk is present when the investor takes possession of collateral, would it 
for instance poses a threat to the environment, as fines, decontamination or compliance to 
standards can become costly. A second indirect risk arises from changes in environmental or 
social legislation (or consumer preferences), which can affect company‟s revenues and 
thereby its default probability. Finally, a reputational risk is also present where actions of 
borrowers may negatively feedback on its financiers. Hence the following hypothesis is 
proposed. 
Hypotheses on strategic risk management: 
 H5: Responsible practices in Private Equity are a risk-management tool. 
 
3.2.3. Hypothesis on New markets creation as a strategic driver 
Environmental issues can create new business opportunities and offers wide innovation 
possibilities. This opening up of previously undiscovered market has early been highlighted 
as a rational for CSR (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995; Porter and Kramer, 2002). The Private 
Equity industry already seized this opportunity, as witnessed by their increasing involvement 
in the renewable energy and clean technology markets. Structurally, part of the Private Equity 
business exists to finance and support new companies and new markets. 
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Indeed, business angels, seed capital and more globally speaking venture capital provide 
equity to managers creating or developing businesses. Typically, venture capital is oriented 
towards innovative firms (health sector, biotechnologies, informatics, energy sector) that can 
exploit new market opportunities based on consumers‟ new demand. To do so, they are 
usually specialized in a small group of industries (Sahlman, 1990) as identifying profitable 
ideas needs good technical and market knowledge. Conversely, buyouts usually target more 
mature markets with steady cash flows (services, consumer goods, chemistry, industry) in 
which CSR rather consists in a transversal approach than in the development of brand new 
products.  
The following hypothesis can thus be proposed. 
 
Hypotheses on strategic new market creation: 
 H6: Venture capitalists are more likely than other Private Equity investors to develop 
specialized green funds in order to open new markets. 
 
However, we should note that cleantech funds are distinct from responsible investment “per 
se”. For instance, investing in solar panels does not imply that a full ESG risk analysis has 
been conducted. The gap between green funds and socially responsible investing even appears 
acknowledged and institutionalized by the Private Equity industry, as witnessed by the co-
existence in the French Private Equity Association of a “Sustainable Growth Club” and a 
“Green Techs Club”. 
 
 
 
Think Global, Invest Responsible: Why the Private Equity Industry Goes Green 
18 
 
3.2.4. Hypothesis on Differentiation and related compliance to Limited Partners demand 
as strategic drivers 
Differentiation can drive responsible investment in Private Equity firms under a twofold 
motivation: reducing competition intensity and capturing Limited Partners‟ preferences.  
Competition intensity between Private Equity firms rocketed up with the financial crisis and 
the 2009 crash of equity raised worldwide. In France, equity raised fell from 12.7 billion EUR 
in 2008 to 3.6 billion in 2009, representing a 71% withdraw. Hereby General Partners need 
harder than ever to realize value; debt markets remain uncertain; and fundraising is 
jeopardized by many Limited Partners facing liquidity issues. Most of the French drop came 
from the two historically main Limited Partner categories, banks (-77%) and insurance 
companies (-81%). Meanwhile, individual investors best resisted to the crisis (-12%), thus 
becoming the first source of equity raised in 2009 (AFIC, 2010). Consequently, the financial 
crisis tightened up fundraising and drastically increased competition intensity between Private 
Equity firms to attract investors. Competition for fund raising will keep on increasing over the 
next years as a consequence of the Basel III global regulatory standard on bank capital 
adequacy and liquidity, which ranked Private Equity funds as being among the most risky and 
illiquid assets. 
However, competition is likely to be heterogeneously perceived by Private Equity funds 
depending on whether they are captive funds or independent funds. A captive fund is 
significantly owned by its Limited Partners (typically a bank or a corporation); hereby 
fundraising is eased. On the contrary, an independent fund is owned by the Private Equity 
firm partners and needs to compete to raise funds. Previous literature already highlighted 
different behaviors between captive and independent funds (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; 
Hellmann, 2002; Hellman et al., 2004) 
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Integrating ESG criteria might thus be used by Private Equity firms as a differentiation tool to 
attract Limited Partners. CSR has already been shown to be a means of differentiation in 
otherwise competitive environments (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Fisman et al., 2007), 
and to most strongly affect performance in low-innovation firms and in industries little 
segmented (Hull and Rothenberg, 2008), as is the case of the Private Equity industry. 
Moreover, in a KPMG (2010) survey, ESG risks indeed ranked top among respondents when 
asked in which areas they would require more information over the next year. As put by a 
General Partner in the Ten Takeaways from the 2010 Private Equity International CFOs and 
COOs Forum: “When a Limited Partner asks for information – any information – you do it”. 
Since fundraising competition is likely to be tougher for independent funds than captive 
funds, they might also be more induced to differentiate by offering CSR attributes to their 
investors. 
Hypotheses on strategic differentiation by responsible investing: 
 H7A: Independent funds are more likely than captive funds to develop responsible 
practices as a differentiation tool to attract investors. 
 
Another related motivation for CSR differentiation in the Private Equity context might also be 
to capture Limited Partners‟ preference. Theoretical and empirical work previously found that 
individual investors may derive non-financial utility from investing in SRI funds (Bollen, 
2007; Renneboog et al., 2007). Moreover, different investors exhibit differences in solvency 
and returns requirements, extent of regulatory oversight, corporate objectives and accounting 
rules (Cumming and Johan, 2007). They might also differ in their CSR commitments. In 
particular, earlier studies support that long-term investments are positively correlated with 
corporate social performance (Cox et al., 2004; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Graves and 
Waddock, 1994). Among long-term investors, the regulatory constraints which European 
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Pension funds already face (see Renneboog et al. (2008)‟ review of Pension funds European 
regulations) are likely to increase their interest for French responsible investments.  
The following hypotheses are thus proposes. 
 H7B: Funds with long-term investors, in particular pension-funds, as Limited Partners 
are more likely to implement responsible practices. 
 
3.3. Hypothesis on Responsive drivers of responsible Private Equity 
Strategic drivers of responsible investing are typically opposed to responsive drivers. Whereas 
the former imply a proactive use of CSR to generate profits, the latter hints that sacrificing 
profits to provide environmental or social performance will hinder the firm from social 
pressure. Supporting this dichotomy, Baron et al. (2011) empirically show that responsive 
CSR increases with the firm‟s slack resources and not strategic CSR.  
The Private Equity industry has been the focus of intense criticism over the past few years, 
both in Anglo-Saxon and Continental Europe countries. The publication of Behind the 
buyouts (2007) by the Service Employees International Union, representing over 2 million 
employees in North America, raised a criticism wave focused on Private Equity‟s lack of 
transparency and foresight in labor relations. In France, an “LBO collective” was created in 
2006, gathering union and media protest. Their concern was brought to the French National 
Assembly in 2007 by the Bocquet report, which blamed short-termism impacting employees, 
drying-off of investing capacities and prevalence of short-term financial profits over long-
term industrial growth in companies financed by the Private Equity industry.  
Whether those concerns were grounded only find mild support by academics. On the French 
market, Boucly et al. (2009) show that Private Equity has a positive effect on employment 
and wages. In one of the larger study ever conducted on the topic, Davis et al. (2008) focus 
over the 1980-2008 period on United States establishments financed by Private Equity and 
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find that employment increases less than in other firms in the retail business sector, but not in 
the manufacturing sector. Amess and Wright (2007) highlight a similar growth of LBO and 
non-LBO firms in the United Kingdom over the 1999-2004 period. Evidence that non-
financial stakeholders suffer Private Equity short-termism is thus at best mixed.  
However, the financial crash the world economy underwent drew public attention to the 
funds‟ activity. The Private Equity recent surge also made it clearly visible. A General Partner 
hence stated in the British Venture Capital Association report (2010): “General Partners must 
accept that, now that they are managing large amounts of money, they face increased scrutiny 
from governments”. Grounded or not, the reputation of Private Equity has been tarnished and 
it social interest is now contested. Dominique Senequier, chief executive of Axa Private 
Equity, a world leader General Partners, hence stated: 
"The pursuit of short-term profit has tarnished Private Equity’s reputation and played havoc 
with many solid businesses. At Axa Private Equity, we believe we should regard the building of 
relationships with all stakeholders as an investment in itself, in order to maximise the benefit to 
all parties over the long term". 
Cases of visible polluting industries increasing their environmental and/or social performance 
under social pressure are many in the CSR literature. The “license to operate” concept 
proposed by Post et al. (2002) well summarizes that a firm can hardly survive long when its 
social interest is contested and its actions have lost legitimacy.  
However, social pressure is likely to focus on specific Private Equity actors, namely large 
visible firms and/or LBO. Indeed, Cumming and Johan (2007) indicate that socially 
responsible Private Equity investment programs are more common among larger institutional 
investors. This finding is in line with larger companies tending to be more scrutinized than 
smaller ones. Second, LBO have been more subject to social criticism than other types of 
Private Equity, even though Venture Capital‟s drawbacks have also been pointed out 
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(Hellmann et al., 2008; Ueda, 2004). LBO and Transmission funds being both larger and 
more subject to criticism than other Private Equity funds types, the following hypothesis can 
be proposed.  
 
Hypotheses on responsive driver of responsible investing: 
 H8: Large and thus visible Private Equity firms as well as leveraged buyouts 
specialists are more likely to engage in responsible practices that are well formalized and 
publicly communicated to protect their reputation and license-to-operate. 
 
The following section now presents the data on which the established hypotheses are tested.  
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3. DATA AND METHOD 
3.1. The French Private Equity industry 
Second largest market in Europe after the United Kingdom, the French Private Equity market 
(comprising both venture capital and buyouts) is also the third market worldwide in amounts 
invested behind the United States market (AFIC, 2010).  
The French Private Equity industry is usually segmented in: seed and venture capital (9.4% 
funds invested), growth capital (35.9%) and transmission capital transactions (54.7%; data 
AFIC, 2010). Leveraged buyouts (LBO) mainly occur in Transmission Capital and essentially 
deal with divestments of subsidiaries within groups (“spin-offs”; 64.1%); transmission of 
family businesses (30.8%) and to a minor extent with stockmarket-listed companies going 
private (“PTPs”; 5.1%).  
The French Private Equity market is hence representative of the European market. However, 
some differences appear compared to Anglo-Saxon markets. For instance, PTPs are limited in 
France compared to the United States and the United Kingdom industries due to regulatory 
constraints (Le Nadant and Perdreau, 2006). Another specificity of the French Private Equity 
market arises from lower debt pressure (Desbrières and Schatt, 2002) as well as the 
substantial part of their personal wealth French managers usually invest in the company's 
capital (Mehran, 1995; Desbrières and Schatt, 2002).  
 
3.2. Sampling and structural data 
The sample gathers observations on 309 Private Equity firms in 2011. It is thus close to the 
whole French industry, and include 278 out of the 280 members of the French Private Equity 
Associations, non members of the Association and French local Private Equity firms 
sponsored by the French Sovereign Wealth Funds (FSI). Equity Data was collected from the 
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Private Equity firms‟ website, press releases and specialized media1 on: their main 
characteristics (firm age and size; portfolio size); financial structure (assets managed; funds 
raised); legal form; ownership (firm shareholders); Limited Partners; activity (transaction 
type); investment scope (geographical, financial and sectoral scope); management (gender and 
background); and public responsible investment practices (signatory of the UNPRI and of the 
French National Association Ethics Chart; management of green or social funds; web 
communication on responsible investment practices; interest as proxied by answer to 
responsible investment surveys).  
Variable description and descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1 and the correlation 
matrix in the Appendices.  
                                                          
1
 Le Guide des Sociétés de Capital Investissement 2010 & 2011; http://investing.businessweek.com ; 
http://www.cdcentreprises.fr 
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics on public data 
Variable name   Definition  Observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Main characteristics       
Firm Age  Years elapsed since firm foundation  310 13.2 11.7 0 102 
Workforce  Number of employees  286 13.2 27.2 1 371 
Funds  Number of funds managed by the firm  302 5.0 8.7 0 65 
Companies  Number of companies hold in portfolio  288 39.7 74.2 0 700 
Assets managed  Millions of Euros of assets managed  295 876.2 2951.7 0 32000 
         
Ownership: Percentage of firms shares...       
Listed  ... listed on a Stock market (in %)./  303 0.01 0.09 0 1 
PE firm  ...  owned by another Private Equity firm (in %).  274 0.16 0.34 0 1 
Partners  ...  owned by the firm Partners (in %).  274 0.42 0.47 0 1 
Bank  ... owned by a Bank (in %).  274 0.18 0.33 0 1 
Insurance company  ... owned by an insurance company (in %)  274 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Industry  ... owned by an industrial corporation (in %).  274 0.05 0.19 0 1 
French state  ... owned directly or indirectly by the French State (in %).  274 0.11 0.26 0 1 
Other  ... owned by other shareholders (in %).  274 0.03 0.14 0 1 
         
Limited Partners: Dummy variable equal to 1 if....., 0 otherwise       
LP Industry  ....the firm manages funds provided by an industrial corporation  271 0.19 0.39 0 1 
LP Captive 
 
... the firm is captive and essentially manages funds provided by a single 
bank or insurance 
 
271 0.32 0.47 0 1 
LP Sovereign  ...the firm manages funds provided by a Sovereign Wealth Funds  274 0.39 0.49 0 1 
LP Individuals   ... the firm manages funds provided by individuals  273 0.21 0.41 0 1 
LP Institutional  ... the firm manages institutional funds (except pension funds)  267 0.76 0.43 0 1 
LP Pension funds  ... the firm manages funds provided by pension funds  267 0.26 0.44 0 1 
LP Family offices  ... the firm manages funds provided by family offices  266 0.37 0.48 0 1 
         
Activity        
Venture Capital  Percentage of funds invested in venture capital  303 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Transmission  Percentage of funds invested in transmission capital  303 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Growth  Percentage of funds invested in growth capital  303 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Mezzanine  Percentage of funds invested in mezzanine  303 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Distressed
 
Capital  Percentage of funds invested in distressed capital  303 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Funds of funds 
 
Percentage of funds invested in funds of funds 
 
303 0.11 0.31 0 1 
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Investment scope: Dummy variable equal to 1 if...., 0 otherwise       
Minority  .... the firm invests as a minority shareholder  242 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Regional scope  ... the firm invests at a regional scope   311 0.92 0.27 0 1 
European scope  ... the firm invests at a European scope  311 0.58 0.50 0 1 
International 
 
scope  ... the firm invests at an international scope  311 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Sector  ...  the firm manages at least one fund specialized in a sector  302 0.36 0.48 0 1 
         
Management: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the Chairman ..., 0 otherwise       
Gender  ... is a woman  299 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Founder  ... founded the firm  290 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Engineer  ... has a French “Grandes Ecoles” Engineer background   256 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Business school  ...has a French Business School background  254 0.47 0.50 0 1 
International  ... has an international background  254 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Other  ... has a different French background  254 0.46 0.50 0 1 
         
Public Responsible Investment Practices: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm.... , 0 otherwise       
UNPRI  ... is a UNPRI signatory  316 0.09 0.28 0 1 
AFIC Chart  ... is signatory of the French Private Equity Association Ethics Chart  317 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Green or Social 
fund 
 ... manages at least one fund with a social or environmental target  
302 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Communication   ...has a website referring to responsible investing practices  297 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Interest  ... answered to responsible investment survey  308 0.24 0.43 0 1 
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3.3. Survey data 
Whereas structural and investment data can be collected in the public domain, such is not the 
case of strategies behind responsible investment practices. To get an insider perspective, the 
database is thus completed with survey data.  
The survey was built in partnership with Novethic, a subsidiary of the French public 
institution and long-term investor Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, and sent to 308 Private 
Equity firms in March 2011. The questionnaire comprises items on practical ESG integration 
and formalization; dedicated resources; greenhouse gas emission assessment; positive or 
negative screening; support provided to the company portfolio to foster CSR; belief in the 
importance of ESG integration for Limited Partners and firm reputation. Questionnaires were 
emailed and filled online. The return rate of 24.0% (74 respondents out of 308 firms) exceeds 
those usually observed in Private Equity surveys (Cumming and Johan, 2007; BVCA, 2010).  
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2.  
To limit social desirability bias, the questionnaire made no reference to “socially responsible 
investment” or to “ethics” (Neumann, 2003; Vyvyan et al., 2011). To stimulate frank answers, 
the anonymity of respondents was ensured (Kuckertz and Wagner, 2009). Questionnaire 
wording (translated from French)2 is presented in the Appendices.  
Another common bias in surveys arises from self-exclusion of respondents. Following Moore 
and Reichert (1983) and Kuckertz and Wagner (2009), this issue is dealt with by comparing 
firm characteristics of the respondents to the non-respondents. Univariate tests were used ( t-
tests with Satterthwaite‟s approximation when needed; chi-square tests for categorical data). 
Main findings are that responding and non-responding groups are similar in terms of firm 
size, management, investment scope and type. However, as expected (Kuckertz and Wagner, 
2009), replies contain a disproportionate number of companies particularly concerned about 
                                                          
2
 Original French questionnaire available upon request 
Think Global, Invest Responsible: Why the Private Equity Industry Goes Green 
28 
 
responsible investing. Hereby survey answers are used as a proxy for firm‟s interest in 
responsible investment practices. 
  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of survey data 
  All respondents  UNPRI signatories 
  Obs.  Mean StD.  Obs Mean 
Formalization        
ESG Chart  74 0.35 0.48  22 0.59 
ESG formation of PE firm employees   74 0.46 0.50  22 0.73 
ESG issues managed by a specialized employee  69 0.20 0.40  22 0.36 
ESG issues managed by a non specialized employee  69 0.35 0.48  22 0.36 
ESG issues directly managed by investors  69 0.26 0.44  22 0.23 
ESG issues managed by a specialized third party  69 0.03 0.16  22 0.05 
Engagement        
ESG Chart sent to portfolio companies   74 0.26 0.42  22 0.36 
Monitor E. performance of portfolio companies  74 0.20 0.40  22 0.41 
Monitor S. performance of portfolio companies  74 0.53 0.50  22 0.64 
Monitor G. performance of portfolio companies  74 0.66 0.48  22 0.68 
Demand ESG reporting to portfolio companies  74 0.22 0.41  22 0.41 
ESG issues brought to company‟s supervisory board  74 0.23 0.42  22 0.32 
ESG issues in shareholders‟ pact  74 0.18 0.38  22 0.18 
Visit companies and plants  74 0.26 0.44  22 0.27 
Screening        
Sectoral or normative exclusion  74 0.84 0.37  22 0.73 
Already discarded investment on ESG grounds  74 0.45 0.50  22 0.59 
Value financial performance driver        
ESG impact measured  66 0.17 0.38  21 0.29 
Already bargained lower company price on ESG grounds   74 0.12 0.33  22 0.18 
ESG issues matter for risk management  74 0.64 0.48  22 0.77 
ESG issues matter to increase company value  74 0.43 0.50  22 0.54 
LP demand driver        
ESG Chart communicated to Limited Partners  74 0.24 0.43  22 0.41 
ESG reporting communicated to Limited Partners  74 0.12 0.33  22 0.32 
ESG performance matters to Limited Partners  74 0.51 0.50  22 0.73 
Reputation driver        
ESG Chart public  74 0.05 0.23  22 0.18 
ESG reporting public  74 0.01 0.12  22 0.05 
ESG issues matter for reputation and image risk  74 0.46 0.50  22 0.59 
 
 
4. MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive statistics on public and survey data provide first elements of analysis (Tables 1 
and 2). Probit regressions are then used to analyze the factors driving the probability that a 
Private Equity firm implements responsible investment practices. Three public indicators of 
responsible investing are empirically investigated: being a UN PRI signatory (Tables 3 and 
4); managing a funds specialized on environmental or social issues (Table 5); and 
communicating on responsible investing on website (Table 6). 
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Results are now presented and discussed. 
 
4.1. Results on Characteristics of Responsible Private Equity 
Results confirm hypothesis H1: Responsible Private Equity firms do not belong to an SRI 
niche market but rather integrate ESG issues in mainstream business. Indeed, we find that 
12% firms manage at least one environmental or social funds (Table 1). Yet only 6 firms (less 
than 2%) specialize on such funds.. Most of those who do manage green funds also manage 
classic funds. Signatories of the UN PRI and firms who answered survey, i.e. firms who have 
an interest for CSR issues, are widely conventional Private Equity funds.  
Results mildly support hypothesis H2: Responsible Private Equity investors are active 
shareholders yet also widely use ESG screening. 84% firms already discarded an investment 
opportunity of ESG grounds (see Table 2). Let us note that this high percentage might be 
driven up by governance issues, at the core of the Private Equity business. Indeed, we see 
from table 2 that only 23% brought ESG issues to company‟s supervisory board. Engagement 
nevertheless appears strong as 53% responders use direct monitoring of social issues in 
company (64% among UN PRI signatories), 26% visit companies or plants and 22% demand 
ESG reporting to portfolio companies (41% for UN PRI). However, ESG issue management 
is not legally enforced though the shareholders‟ pact. 
Finally, results confirm hypothesis H3: Responsible practices are more likely to be 
implemented in large Private Equity firms in terms of workforce. Indeed, probabilities of 
being a UN PRI signatory (Tables 3 and 4) and managing green or social funds (Table 5) 
significantly increase with size (here size of the workforce). Moreover, survey descriptive 
statistics indicate that 46% of survey respondents provide and ESG formation to their 
employees (Table 2). This formation argues both in favor of the current lack of human capital 
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to manage such issues, which might be problematic for ESG management, as well as a real 
involvement to develop this human capital. 
 
4.2. Results on strategic drivers of responsible Private Equity 
Results partly support hypothesis H4: Responsible practices in Private Equity are motivated 
by creating value in portfolio companies, yet not only. Indeed, survey data highlights that 
43% of respondents only agree with ESG issues being important to create value (54% among 
UN PRI signatories; Table 2). We can note that only 12% ever measured ESG impact on their 
portfolio performance. Hence most investors believing that responsible investing creates 
value do so on qualitative grounds.  
Conversely, hypothesis H5 is confirmed by survey answers: Responsible practices in Private 
Equity are a risk-management tool. 64% of the respondents (77% of UN PRI signatories) 
believe ESG issues matter for risk management (Table 2). 
Strong support is also brought to hypothesis H6: Venture capitalists are more likely than other 
Private Equity investors to develop specialized green funds in order to open new markets. 
Results of the probit regression on the probability to manage such funds indeed increases 
significantly when the firm is a venture capitalist and significantly decreases in Transmission 
capital (buyouts) firms (Table 5). We can also note that Growth Capital firms are also very 
active on GreenTechs. Their activity is indeed more in line with venture capital than with 
buyouts as their invest in expansion cycles of companies. Consequently, Private Equity firms 
managing green funds hence show typical characteristic of venture capitalists, as significantly 
smaller firms in terms of workforce and assets. Probit results also confirm the dichotomy 
between specialized green funds and responsible investing. Indeed, being a UN PRI signatory 
does not increase the probability to manage a green fund (Table 5), and respectively, 
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managing a green funds does not increase the probability to be a UN PRI signatory (Tables 3 
and 4). 
Evidence is mixed on hypothesis H7. As a primer, the belief among General Partners that 
ESG issues matter for Limited Partners is strongly supported by survey data. 51% of the 
respondents agree so, up to 73% among UN PRI signatories. A few firms (12%) actually 
report their ESG performance to Limited Partners, most likely because they are themselves 
still implementing ESG reporting at their portfolio level. 
Hypothesis H7A is confirmed: Independent funds are more likely than captive funds to 
develop responsible practices as a differentiation tool to attract investors. Indeed, results show 
that the probability of being a UN PRI signatory increases (10% significance level) when the 
Private Equity firm is owned by its Partners, hence independent. However, no significant 
effect of specific categories of Limited Partners is found on the probability to be a UN PRI 
signatory, neither positive nor negative. In particular, Captive funds are not less likely to be 
signatories. Yet, results also show that Private Equity firms owned by banks (bank captive 
funds) or by Private Equity firms (PE captive funds) are less likely to communicate on 
responsible investing on their website than other funds. Hypothesis H7A is hence confirmed. 
However, hypothesis H7B is infirmed: Funds with long-term investors, in particular pension-
funds, as Limited Partners do not appear more likely to implement responsible practices. 
Table 3 displays that firms with Pension funds as Limited Partners, as well as Institutional and 
Sovereign Limited Partners, are not more likely to be UN PRI signatories.  
However, ownership seems to matter more than Limited Partners in this regard. CSR 
Communication is also more impacted by who owns the Private Equity firm rather than who 
finances it (Table 6). 
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4.3. Results on Responsive drivers of responsible Private Equity 
Results partly confirm hypothesis H8 on responsive driver of responsible investing: Large and 
thus visible Private Equity firms are more likely to engage in responsible practices that are 
well formalized and publicly communicated to protect their reputation and license-to-operate; 
yet leveraged buyouts specialists do not particularly stand out in this regard.  
As already noted, large Private Equity firms in terms of workforce are more likely to be UN 
PRI signatories (Tables 3 and 4) and to communicate on CSR (Table 6). This effect appears 
stronger and more robust when size is captured by the amounts of assets managed. However, 
being specialized on Transmission capital (hence leveraged buyouts) does not appear as a 
significant factor. 
Survey data also show that ESG Chart, ESG dedicated post, ESG reporting and UN PRI 
signature come as a bundle (see correlation Table A in the Appendices). Hereby formalizing 
responsible investing appears more likely in large Private Equity firms.  
Nevertheless, how to disentangle differentiation from reputation protection? First, let us note 
that 46% survey respondents believe ESG matter for reputation and image risk (59% UN PRI 
signatories), which is high but less than the belief in ESG importance for Limited Partners‟ 
demand. Second, we observe that very few firms communicate their ESG reporting (1%) and 
ESG Chart (5%) to the public. Those elements lead us to conjecture that protecting firm‟s 
image and reputation matters more for the business than for the public. 
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Table 3 Multivariant analysis (Probit) on UNPRI signature drivers 
 model 1  model 2 
 Marginal effect t-stat.  Marginal effect t-stat. 
 Age -1,95e-05 -0.06  5,53e-06 0,02 
Firm characteristics Workforce    5,76e-04 2,18** 
 Companies -9,09e-05 -1,33  -1,49e-04 -1,94* 
Ownership Log(Assets managed) 8,33e-03 2,1**    
PE firm 4,44e-02 1,47  -4,85e-03 -0,4 
Partners 4,78e-02 1,67*    
Bank 4,21e-02 1,28    
Insurance company 4,71e-02 1,09  1,66e-02 0,71 
Industry 6,11e-02 1,77*    
French state 4,87e-02 1,56    
Limited Partners LP Industry    -8,87e-03 -1,37 
LP Captive    -4,79e-03 -0,56 
LP Sovereign    1,39e-02 1,03 
LP Individuals  1,98e-02 1,19  4,52e-03 0,4 
LP Institutional 4,98e-03 1,15  3,20e-03 0,85 
LP Pension funds 1,03e-02 0,94  7,55e-03 0,77 
LP Family offices -1,23e-03 -0,15  -1,15e-02 -1,45 
Activity Venture Capital 9,43e-03 0,74  4,54e-03 0,42 
Transmission -6,27e-03 -0,52  1,15e-03 0,12 
Growth -1,97e-02 -1,34  -2,68e-02 -1,65 
Funds of funds 3,71e-02 0,85  3,40e-03 0,17 
 Mezzanine 2,27e-01 1,94*  2,11e-01 1,9* 
Investment scope Minority 1,90e-02 2,02**  1,97e-02 2,07** 
Regional scope 5,97e-03 0,28  -5,89e-04 -0,04 
European scope -3,36e-02 -1,61  -9,30e-03 -0,77 
International 
 
scope -6,66e-03 -0,91  -8,37e-03 -1,36 
Sector 1,22e-03 0,13  1,30e-02 1,12 
Founder    4,76e-03 0,62 
Management Engineer -9,16e-03 -1,24  -8,09e-03 -1,14 
Business school -1,29e-02 -1,35  -1,03e-03 -0,12 
International 1,82e-02 1,11  1,35e-02 0,98 
Responsible investment 
practices 
AFIC Chart 2,17e-02 1,84*  2,13e-02 1,98** 
Green or Social fund -7,70e-03 -1,35  -7,50e-03 -1,45 
Communication  1,08e-01 2,85***  9,68e-02 2,64*** 
Interest 1,44e-01 3,45***  1,69e-01 3,51*** 
Nb. of obs.  166   163  
Nb of obs. where =1 21   21  
Pseudo R2  53.08   52.67  
Loglikehood function (L) -29.57   -29.64  
LR-Chi-2 statistics 66.91***   65.97***  
NOTE. Table 1 presents results obtained by fitting maximum-likelihood probit models and reports  
marginal effects (change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each continuous variable; 
discrete change in the probability for dummy variables). Pseudo R2 is calculated by McFadden‟s 
formula, which is: Pseudo R2= 1 – log L / log (LR). The LR-Chi2 statistics provides a test of the 
model robustness by indicating that the model as a whole fits significantly better than a model with no 
predictors. 
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Table 4 Multivariant analysis (Probit) on UNPRI signature drivers 
 model 3  model 4 
 Marginal effect t-stat.  Marginal effect t-stat. 
 Age      
Firm characteristics Workforce      
 Companies      
Ownership Log(Assets managed) 1,84e-02 3,23***  1,98e-02 2,86*** 
PE firm 1,40e-01 1,78*    
Partners 1,27e-01 1,69*    
Bank 1,02e-01 1,3    
Insurance company 6,09e-02 0,72    
Industry 1,44e-01 1,71*    
French state 1,44e-01 1,79*    
Limited Partners LP Industry      
LP Captive      
LP Sovereign      
LP Individuals       
LP Institutional      
LP Pension funds      
LP Family offices      
Activity Venture Capital    4,73e-03 0,23 
Transmission    -1,05e-02 -0,46 
Growth    9,89e-03 0,5 
Funds of funds    9,74e-03 0,29 
 Mezzanine    6,01e-03 0,17 
Investment scope Minority      
Regional scope    -9,57e-03 -0,26 
European scope    -1,03e-02 -0,4 
International 
 
scope    -3,67e-02 -2,09** 
Sector      
Founder      
Management Engineer      
Business school      
International      
Responsible investment 
practices 
AFIC Chart 5,11e-02 2,05**  5,39e-02 2,11** 
Green or Social fund -1,44e-03 -0,05  -1,76e-02 -0,68 
Communication  1,56e-01 3,69***  1,97e-01 4,10*** 
Interest      
Nb. of obs.  257   281  
Nb of obs. where =1 24   26  
Pseudo R2  30.89   31.18  
Loglikehood function -55.11   -59.63  
LR-Chi-2 statistics (L) 49.27***   54.03***  
NOTE. Table 2 presents results obtained by fitting maximum-likelihood probit models and reports  
marginal effects (change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each continuous variable; 
discrete change in the probability for dummy variables). Pseudo R2 is calculated by McFadden‟s 
formula, which is: Pseudo R2= 1 – log L / log (LR). The LR-Chi2 statistics provides a test of the 
model robustness by indicating that the model as a whole fits significantly better than a model with no 
predictors. 
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Table 5 Multivariant analysis (Probit) on Green or Social funds management drivers 
  model 1  model 2   model 3   model 4 
 Marginal effect t-stat.  Marginal effect t-stat.  Marginal effect t-stat.  Marginal effect t-stat. 
 Age 5,11e-08 1,92*  4,41e-11 1,71*       
Firm characteristics Workforce    -6,53e-11 -1,65*       
Ownership Log(Assets managed) -2,19e-07 -1,11     -1,91e-02 -2,12**  -9,13e-03 -1,12 
PE firm 
-3,40e-07 -0,20 
 
-2,07e-09 -1,47 
 
-7,60e-04 -0,01 
   
Partners -3,10e-08 -0,04     -2,51e-02 -0,31    
Bank 9,63e-07 0,93     1,14e-02 0,13    
Industry 4,12e-06 1,90*     7,94e-02 0,78    
French state -3,26e-06 -1,76*     6,60e-02 0,70    
Limited Partners LP Industry    6,70e-07 1,22       
LP Captive    1,13e-11 0,02       
LP Sovereign    3,32e-10 0,42       
LP Individuals  -1,69e-07 -0,34  1,47e-05 1,55       
LP Institutional 5,99e-07 1,66*  6,69e-10 1,46       
LP Pension funds 4,86e-04 1,83*  1,64e-07 1,46       
LP Family offices -1,52e-07 -0,24  1,60e-09 0,52       
Activity Venture Capital 3,24e-05 1,99**  1,56e-06 1,72*     5,55e-02 1,99** 
Transmission -7,88e-03 -2,16***  -1,80e-04 -1,72*     -7,36e-02 -2,35** 
Growth 7,63e-05 2,08**  1,49e-05 1,46     7,66e-02 2,68*** 
Funds of funds 4,04e-03 1,56  3,18e-05 1,34     1,85e-02 0,38 
Investment scope Minority -1,37e-04 -1,40  -2,75e-09 -0,62       
Regional scope -3,49e-07 -0,71  -1,06e-09 -0,96     3,87e-02 0,84 
European scope -4,87e-05 -1,37  -1,09e-07 -1,09     -1,63e-03 -0,05 
International  scope -1,85e-07 -0,45  -1,17e-10 -0,55     2,21e-02 0,64 
Founder    -5,30e-09 -1       
Management Engineer 9,95e-05 1,59  1,03e-07 1,44       
Business school 6,58e-09 0,01  -1,65e-10 -0,28       
International 2,05e-04 1,38  1,32e-06 1,70*       
Responsible 
investment practices 
AFIC Chart -3,53e-07 -0,26  -7,03e-06 -1,36  6,45e-02 1,77*  2,82e-02 0,97 
UNPRI 4,48e-08 0,05  5,10e-06 1,14  -3,57e-02 -0,80  -2,85e-02 -0,82 
Communication  2,09e-02 2,18**  1,36e-03 2,00**  3,95e-01 5,16***  3,40e-01 5,40*** 
Interest 1,35e-05 1,27  2,27e-07 1,5       
Nb. of obs.  174   167   257   281  
Nb of obs. where =1 14   14   27   30  
Pseudo R2  65.03   65.97   24.25   32.56  
Loglikehood function -17.03   -16.37   -65.43   -64.38  
LR - Chi-2 statistics 63.34***   63.47***   41.88***   62.15***  
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Table 6 Multivariant analysis (Probit) on CSR communication drivers 
  model 1   model 2   model 3   model 4 
 Marginal effect t-stat.  Marginal effect t-stat.  Marginal effect t-stat.  Marginal effect t-stat. 
 Age -6,38e-4 -0,31  2,19e-4 0,13       
Firm characteristics Workforce    1,31e-3 1,06       
Ownership Log(Assets managed) 3,92e-3 0,18     3,53e-2 2,99***  2,65e-2 1,99** 
PE firm -3,31e-1 -2,21**  -1,04e-1 -1,23  -2,49e-1 -2,34**    
Partners -1,91e-1 -1,49     -1,78e-1 -1,95*    
Bank -3,23e-1 -2,16**     -2,82e-1 -2,58***    
Industry -7,42e-3 -0,03*     -8,05e-2 -0,6    
French state -3,00e-1 -1,78     -2,07e-1 -1,57    
Limited Partners LP Industry    -1,49e-3 -0,02       
LP Captive    1,74e-2 0,28       
LP Sovereign    4,23e-2 0,6       
LP Individuals  1,35e-1 1,70*  9,22e-2 1,36       
LP Institutional -9,51e-2 -1,14  -9,25e-2 -1,31       
LP Pension funds -3,45e-2 -0,55  -2,33e-2 -0,42       
LP Family offices -8,54e-2 -1,41  -1,08e-1 -1,96**       
Activity Venture Capital 2,95e-2 0,42  -2,52e-2 -0,37     7,73e-3 0,17 
Transmission 5,44e-2 0,72  5,96e-2 0,9     1,55e-2 0,35 
Growth -6,15e-2 -0,88  -8,54e-2 -1,28     -1,89e-2 -0,45 
Mezzanine -8,07e-2 -0,92  -5,88e-2 -0,76     -6,80e-2 -1 
Funds of funds -4,55e-2 -0,44  -3,23e-2 -0,37     -3,41e-2 -0,56 
Investment scope Minority -4,85e-2 -0,52  -5,77e-2 -0,72       
Regional scope 1,42e-1 0,97  6,78e-3 0,06     -1,18e-2 -0,15 
European scope 1,95e-1 2,53**  1,70e-1 2,53**     6,75e-2 1,25 
International  scope 8,82e-2 1,13  8,92e-2 1,23     5,30e-2 1 
Founder    8,25e-2 1,32       
Management Engineer 8,68e-2 1,25  9,57e-2 1,53       
Business school -2,12e-2 -0,36  1,83e-2 0,34       
International 8,04e-2 1,06  7,51e-2 1,1       
Responsible 
investment 
practices 
AFIC Chart 3,31e-4 0,00  4,23e-2 0,75  6,94e-3 0,14  1,12e-2 0,24 
UNPRI 3,17e-1 2,54**  2,10e-1 1,99**  2,88e-1 2,96***  3,15e-1 3,38*** 
Green or social funds  6,48e-1 3,54***  7,02e-1 4,04***  5,17e-1 5,36***  5,19e-1 5,48*** 
Interest 4,18e-2 0,61  4,63e-2 0,72  4,04e-2 0,77  6,45e-2 1,25 
Nb. of obs.  174   167   257   281  
Nb of obs. where =1 36   35   43   48  
Pseudo R2  45.34   46.16   33.62   33.51  
Loglikehood function -48.49   -46.16   -77.06   -85.42  
LR - Chi-2 statistics 80.44***   79.16***   78.03***   86.10***  
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5. DISCUSSION 
Our empirical results support that responsible investment in French Private Equity is a 
mainstream movement which got quickly structured under the impetus of large conventional 
actors, both in terms of human capital and assets managed. This movement in fact appears 
characterized by a mix of both ESG screening and shareholders activism, with Private Equity 
investors typically being much involved in the porfolio company‟s management. Responsible 
investing seems essentially strategically driven, Private Equity investors hereby aiming at 
creating value, improving risk management and differentiating to raise funds, especially 
independent firms. SRI as implemented by those investors therefore appears in line with 
shareholders‟ value maximization and consistent with a business improvement. 
Let us note that shareholders activism on ESG issues quite differs between Private Equity 
investors and Public investors. Indeed, Sparkes (2008) defines shareholder activism as ‘the 
use of the voting rights attached to ordinary shares to influence company management‟. Since 
they usually are majority or significant shareholders, Private Equity investors have 
considerable influence as active investors.  
Moreover, engagement in the specific context of Private Equity is to be distinguished from 
conventional ethical activism, such as undertook by religious institutional investors in the 
United States through the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (Williams, 2005). 
According to Smith (1996), engagement acts as an implicit threat to the company that if the 
investor's concerns are not addressed, an exclusionary strategy may be adopted. Sparkes 
(1998) hence have argued that shareholder activism differs from SRI as advocacy is 
characterized by a single-issue focus, no financial concerns, and the seeking of confrontation 
and publicity; whereas SRI is characterized by multi-issue concern, strong financial interest, 
the seeking of engagement and the avoidance of publicity. However, Private Equity investors 
are active investors who promote ESG issues on strategic grounds rather than ethical ones. 
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Hereby their engagement does not fit to Sparkes‟s definition as they target promoting CSR in 
order to maximize shareholders‟ value. A possible explanation of this difference might lie in 
the specificity of the French context, whereby SRI mainstreaming has been taking place under 
the explicit goal of penetration of ESG criteria into conventional funds, thereby maybe 
creating a sort of „ESG externality‟ on the Responsible Private Equity market.   
Finally, this paper‟s findings on Private Equity investors suggest that those who care for ESG 
issues might have a stronger impact as active investors than Public investors. Indeed, results 
are that 23% of respondents brought ESG issues to company‟s supervisory board, 53% 
directly monitored those issues and 26% visited plants. Compared to such figures, shareholder 
advocacy is still in practice limited on public markets. For instance, Lewis and Mackenzie 
(2000) found little support of hard engagement in their large survey of UK ethical public 
investors, passive signaling (screening) being most favored. In the United States, Lydenberg 
(2002) argues that the “Wall Street Rule” generally applies, that is shareholders are expected 
to regulate managers by selling shares rather than by trying to change management practices 
through engagement. Indeed, SRI funds which used both screening and advocacy accounted 
in 2003 for about a fifth of all SRI funds (Social Investment Forum 2003). In Europe, Eurosif 
(2010 European SRI Survey) estimated €1.5 trillion assets managed were impacted by SRI 
engagement, representing about 28% of all broad SRI approaches in Europe.  
Here we find that conventional Private Equity funds which care for ESG issues appear active 
at an equivalent level on the French market. Hereby findings hint that this financial industry 
might have the potential to become a powerful tool to promote sustainable practices in 
portfolio companies. However, to realize this potentiality, Private Equity firms need to 
develop a sound expertise of ESG issues and to acquire the corresponding human capital. 
Considering the current difficulties of the industry related to the financial crisis and liquidity 
dearth, it seems unlikely that Private Equity firms will currently invest in such competencies. 
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Would that turn out so, the development of an effective and reliable responsible investment 
movement beyond its current frontiers might be compromised.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Whereas most SRI literature has focused on public markets, this paper highlights that French 
Private Equity investors recently seized ESG issues and are developing a mainstream 
responsible investing approach structurally based on engagement. As significant shareholders, 
Private Equity investors have the potential to actively promote sustainable practices in the 
firms they own. Findings support that such activism is strategically grounded, as managing 
portfolio ESG issues might enhance value creation, enlarge risk management and enable 
Private Equity firms to differentiate to raise funds. Considering the specificities of the studied 
market, a promising research path would be to explore whether this responsible investing 
movement is restricted to France or whether drivers and maturation differ between Private 
Equity markets.  
At a time of financial crisis and regulation stringency for Private Equity, responsible 
investment hence appears to have been “thought global” by large leading actors to improve 
the mainstream business and provide it with new growth tools. However, most Private Equity 
companies currently seem to lack the human capital and expertise essential for successfully 
implementing a profitable ESG issues management. With financial markets still in the crisis 
turmoil and the upcoming of tougher regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy (Basel III), 
the European Private Equity industry environment will quickly evolve in the next few months. 
The question of how the new Private Equity responsible investing movement will react to this 
shifting context, and potential consequences for firm managers‟ access to capital, henceforth 
still lay wide open.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Survey wording 
 
« ESG Practices of Private Equity Investors – Survey 2011 » (Novethic) 
 
 
ESG Policy at the Management Firm Level 
1) Have you formalized a policy or a chart stating how you take into account Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) criteria in your portfolio and/or your investments?  
Yes; Please detail since when / No, but we plan to do so this year (directly go to question 5) / No (directly go to 
question 5) 
2) If you answered yes to question 1, to whom do you communicate it? 
Our co-workers / Our investors / Our portfolio companies / Publicly communicated 
3) Are you a signatory of the French Private Equity Association Chart? 
Yes / No; why?  
4) Are you a signatory of the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investments (PRI)? 
Yes; Please detail since when / No, but we plan to do so this year / No.  
5) Are your co-workers trained in ESG issues management in their daily business?  
Yes; Please detail how / No. 
6) Your ESG policy is run by : 
A co-worker dedicated to this policy / A co-worker non dedicated to this policy / Investment directors / An 
external third-party / Other, please detail.  
7) Within your management firm, which policies have you launched in terms of sustainable development?  
ESG evaluation at the management firm level 
Environment: Management firm carbon footprint evaluation / Videoconferences / Energy savings thanks to eco-
gestures  
Social: employee training / annual job appraisal / employee profit-sharing 
Governance: Ethics Chart or Deontology Code 
Other: please detail 
Implementation in portfolio companies 
8) Do you exclude from your investments:  
Specific industries: Weapons / Alcohol / Tobacco / Pornography / Hazard games / GMOs / Nuclear Energy / 
Other, please detail 
Specific policies considered reprehensible: Child labor / Forced labor / Other, please specify 
9) Which means do you use to evaluate ESG practices in companies (before investment; over the 
investment phase; while the company is hold in your portfolio)? 
Dialogue between the management firm and the portfolio company / ESG survey sent to the company / 
Management firm internal ESG audit grid / Acquisition dues diligences / Specific acquisition dues diligences / 
Audit by an external third-party / Other, please detail. 
10) In this context, are environmental issues (water and energy consumptions, carbon assessment, waste 
management, etc.) evaluated:  
 Always Sometimes * Never 
No, but we plan to 
do so this year* 
When you acquire a company         
When you hold a company in portfolio         
When you sell a company         
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*Please detail how many companies were evaluated in 2010.  
 
1) In this context, are social issues (training, skill management, diversity, non discrimination, etc.) 
evaluated:  
 Always Sometimes * Never 
No, but we plan to 
do so this year* 
When you acquire a company         
When you hold a company in portfolio         
When you sell a company         
*Please detail how many companies were evaluated in 2010.  
 
1) In this context, are governance issues (allocation and delegation of authority, board formation, board 
independence, fight against corruption, etc.) evaluated:  
 Always Sometimes * Never 
No, but we plan to 
do so this year* 
When you acquire a company         
When you hold a company in portfolio         
When you sell a company         
*Please detail how many companies were evaluated in 2010.  
 
2) How do you support your portfolio companies to implement their sustainable development policy?  
Regular dialogue between the management firm and a dedicated contact in the portfolio company / Link 
establishment with a specialized consultant / Support of the ESG reporting / Follow-up, but the portfolio 
company has full autonomy to implement the policy / Other, please detail.  
3) How do you ensure ESG criteria are taken into account in the companies in which you invest? 
Chart compliance request / ESG reporting request / ESG issues on the agenda of the company‟s supervisory 
board / Visit of plants / ESG clause in the shareholders pact / Other; please detail.  
4) Have you ever measured the impact of the ESG issue management on your portfolio? 
Yes; please detail / No.  
5) The ESG evaluation of a company already led you to :  
Decrease a target company valuation / Reject an investment / The company ESG evaluation had no impact on 
our management / Other; please detail.  
 
Relationships with investors 
6) Have you implemented a regular ESG reporting of your portfolio? 
Yes, it is public / Yes, it is communicated to our investors / No / No, but we plan to do so this year.  
7) Do your Limited Partners ask you how you manage ESG issues?  
Yes, often / Yes, sometimes / No, never.  
8) If you answered yes to question 7, how have your Limited Partners formalized their request (survey, 
side letters, shareholders pact, etc.)?  
 
Motivations 
9) For which reasons do you take into account ESG issues in your investments? 
To improve risk management (social litigations, environmental liability, etc.) / To answer our investors‟ demand 
/ To ease fund raising / To improve deal flow / To reduce the management firm reputational risk / to improve the 
value of portfolio companies / other, please detail.  
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Table A - Correlation Matrix (1/3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
1-Firm Age 1,00                          
2-Workforce 0,11 1,00                         
3-Funds -0,02 0,44 1,00                        
4-Companies 0,16 0,48 0,64 1,00                       
5-Assets managed 0,14 0,36 0,21 0,32 1,00                      
6-Listed 0,18 0,03 -0,09 -0,06 0,11 1,00                     
7-PE firm 0,00 0,02 0,01 -0,08 -0,01 -0,03 1,00                    
8-Partners -0,13 -0,15 -0,06 -0,26 0,06 -0,12 -0,40 1,00                   
9-Bank 0,08 0,18 0,18 0,34 -0,08 -0,08 -0,23 -0,44 1,00                  
10-Insurance 0,05 0,07 0,09 0,27 0,20 -0,03 -0,09 -0,19 -0,06 1,00                 
11-Industry -0,01 -0,06 -0,07 -0,01 -0,07 -0,04 -0,12 -0,21 -0,07 -0,03 1,00                
12-French state -0,03 -0,01 -0,05 0,02 -0,08 -0,03 -0,15 -0,34 -0,03 -0,01 -0,02 1,00               
13-Other 0,06 -0,04 -0,10 -0,07 -0,02 0,04 -0,09 -0,15 -0,07 -0,01 -0,04 0,00 1,00              
14-LP Industry -0,05 -0,08 -0,09 -0,04 -0,13 -0,08 -0,05 -0,11 -0,08 -0,06 0,50 0,10 -0,08 1,00             
15-LP Captive -0,01 0,07 0,12 0,20 0,01 0,07 0,17 -0,33 0,44 0,14 -0,14 -0,20 -0,03 -0,16 1,00            
16-LP Sovereign -0,09 0,02 -0,03 0,14 -0,10 -0,05 -0,11 -0,17 0,00 0,05 -0,07 0,54 -0,03 0,28 -0,12 1,00           
17-LP Individuals  -0,08 0,20 0,48 0,27 0,12 0,01 0,04 0,06 0,06 -0,03 -0,06 -0,20 0,01 -0,12 0,03 -0,02 1,00          
18-LP Institutional -0,01 0,03 0,02 -0,12 0,08 -0,05 -0,01 0,39 -0,37 -0,05 -0,14 -0,03 -0,05 0,04 -0,35 0,17 0,04 1,00         
19-LP Pension funds 0,08 0,20 -0,03 0,06 0,32 0,07 0,06 0,18 -0,18 0,05 -0,12 -0,10 -0,01 -0,06 -0,20 -0,03 -0,04 0,31 1,00        
20-LP Family offices 0,04 0,00 -0,08 -0,08 -0,10 0,04 -0,07 0,14 -0,15 -0,03 -0,04 0,02 0,06 0,10 -0,23 0,18 -0,08 0,24 0,08 1,00       
21-VC -0,03 0,07 0,30 0,19 -0,09 -0,04 0,00 -0,15 0,03 -0,09 0,04 0,25 0,05 0,19 -0,03 0,32 0,23 -0,07 -0,13 -0,05 1,00      
22-Transmission 0,15 0,12 -0,02 0,09 0,16 0,09 -0,07 0,01 0,02 0,08 0,01 -0,06 0,05 -0,04 -0,06 -0,14 -0,01 0,10 0,16 -0,01 -0,26 1,00     
23-Growth 0,00 0,08 0,12 0,20 -0,13 -0,05 -0,03 -0,09 0,22 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 0,04 0,06 0,11 0,17 -0,07 -0,12 -0,07 0,00 0,22 1,00    
24-Mezzanine 0,01 0,16 0,02 0,14 0,12 0,03 0,04 -0,10 -0,04 0,19 0,09 -0,03 -0,02 -0,03 0,10 -0,06 -0,10 -0,03 -0,07 0,04 -0,14 0,01 -0,03 1,00   
25-Distressed Capital -0,02 0,11 -0,09 -0,11 0,03 -0,01 0,04 0,09 -0,10 0,00 -0,07 -0,03 -0,04 -0,09 -0,02 -0,03 -0,08 0,09 0,06 -0,05 -0,14 0,08 0,01 -0,03 1,00  
26-Funds of funds -0,08 0,28 0,28 0,20 0,01 -0,06 0,09 -0,08 0,07 0,13 -0,08 -0,04 -0,07 -0,13 0,10 -0,09 0,07 -0,10 0,06 -0,06 -0,01 -0,12 -0,10 0,09 0,00 1,00 
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Table A (continues) - Correlation Matrix (2/3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
27-Minority 0,05 0,06 0,17 0,25 -0,25 -0,07 0,02 -0,23 0,24 0,08 -0,02 0,12 -0,10 0,08 0,12 0,32 0,17 -0,11 -0,14 -0,02 0,37 -0,30 0,36 0,09 -0,28 0,12 
28-Regional 0,05 -0,09 -0,08 0,06 -0,13 -0,07 -0,09 -0,28 0,21 -0,01 0,01 0,39 -0,01 0,11 0,01 0,33 -0,01 0,02 -0,22 -0,02 0,16 0,07 0,16 -0,07 -0,06 -0,10 
29-European -0,01 0,15 0,15 0,01 0,23 0,11 0,01 0,19 -0,16 0,04 -0,02 -0,16 -0,03 -0,07 -0,09 -0,18 -0,10 0,03 0,31 0,02 -0,06 -0,10 -0,19 0,08 -0,01 0,21 
30-International 0,01 0,23 0,13 0,17 0,25 0,23 -0,03 0,01 -0,01 0,10 0,02 -0,09 -0,08 0,02 0,03 -0,06 0,00 0,03 0,18 -0,03 0,12 -0,04 0,04 0,10 0,04 0,17 
31-Sector -0,12 -0,09 0,06 -0,13 -0,07 -0,08 0,04 0,06 -0,11 -0,05 0,11 -0,01 -0,03 0,16 -0,07 0,04 -0,01 0,08 0,02 -0,03 0,26 -0,33 -0,08 -0,10 -0,04 -0,01 
32-Gender -0,09 -0,02 0,00 0,14 0,14 0,12 -0,10 -0,07 -0,05 0,14 0,15 0,09 0,00 0,08 0,04 0,14 0,01 -0,06 -0,04 -0,04 0,06 -0,02 -0,03 0,06 -0,07 0,01 
33-Founder -0,17 -0,06 -0,06 -0,11 -0,09 -0,10 -0,13 0,51 -0,32 -0,02 -0,08 -0,26 -0,04 -0,03 -0,22 -0,04 0,12 0,24 0,05 0,08 -0,03 -0,08 0,01 -0,01 0,12 -0,06 
34-Engineer 0,03 -0,03 0,01 0,10 0,11 -0,02 -0,06 -0,04 0,03 0,06 -0,07 0,17 0,02 -0,08 0,00 0,14 -0,01 0,00 0,09 -0,02 -0,02 -0,09 -0,01 0,03 -0,04 -0,08 
35-Business school -0,08 -0,06 0,06 0,00 -0,13 0,07 0,02 -0,01 -0,01 -0,02 0,20 -0,14 -0,11 0,13 0,12 -0,04 0,19 -0,09 -0,12 0,10 0,00 -0,06 0,08 0,04 -0,11 0,06 
36-mgt International -0,07 0,10 0,02 -0,10 0,06 0,06 0,04 0,06 -0,07 -0,09 0,05 -0,11 -0,02 -0,05 -0,08 -0,14 -0,11 0,07 0,10 -0,07 -0,06 0,10 -0,07 0,01 0,10 0,00 
37- mgt Other 0,04 -0,06 -0,02 -0,02 -0,01 -0,08 -0,02 -0,01 0,05 -0,03 -0,08 0,05 0,06 0,07 -0,09 0,04 0,00 0,02 -0,09 0,06 0,11 -0,12 -0,09 -0,12 -0,05 -0,03 
38-UNPRI 0,06 0,13 0,18 0,13 0,19 -0,01 0,02 0,08 -0,06 0,04 -0,05 -0,04 -0,07 -0,07 0,08 -0,06 0,11 0,13 0,16 -0,05 -0,05 0,04 -0,05 -0,01 -0,10 0,06 
39-AFIC Chart -0,04 -0,03 0,10 0,05 -0,01 0,05 0,02 0,20 -0,08 0,04 -0,04 -0,34 0,00 -0,06 0,17 -0,19 0,16 -0,02 0,01 -0,06 -0,10 0,01 0,04 0,01 0,01 0,01 
40-Green or Social fund -0,10 -0,03 0,10 -0,01 -0,07 -0,07 -0,05 -0,05 -0,03 -0,02 0,10 0,07 0,12 0,08 0,06 0,09 0,10 -0,04 -0,10 -0,11 0,21 -0,20 0,15 -0,11 0,00 -0,02 
41-Communication  0,02 0,12 0,12 0,04 0,26 0,04 -0,06 0,07 -0,12 0,11 -0,02 -0,04 0,12 -0,02 0,05 -0,05 0,12 0,04 0,11 -0,15 0,02 -0,01 -0,02 -0,06 -0,11 0,05 
42-Interest 0,03 0,12 0,15 0,10 0,10 -0,04 -0,01 0,00 -0,09 0,04 0,06 0,06 0,09 0,07 0,05 -0,01 0,00 0,16 0,09 -0,01 -0,02 0,08 0,01 0,05 -0,03 0,02 
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Table A (continues) - Correlation Matrix (3/3) 
 (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 
27-Minority 1,00                
28-Regional 0,24 1,00               
29-European -0,17 -0,46 1,00              
30-International 0,07 -0,21 0,36 1,00             
31-Sector 0,03 -0,16 0,18 0,08 1,00            
32-Gender 0,06 -0,02 -0,01 0,03 -0,07 1,00           
33-Founder -0,03 -0,17 0,05 0,00 0,12 0,01 1,00          
34-Engineer -0,04 -0,15 0,11 0,03 0,16 -0,08 -0,12 1,00         
35-Business school 0,08 -0,03 -0,05 -0,05 -0,03 0,08 -0,06 -0,27 1,00        
36-mgt International -0,15 -0,09 0,14 0,16 -0,01 0,09 0,09 -0,14 -0,17 1,00       
37- mgt Other 0,09 0,12 -0,09 0,05 0,07 -0,01 -0,05 -0,09 -0,31 -0,30 1,00      
38-UNPRI 0,00 -0,09 0,12 -0,02 0,00 0,08 0,02 0,01 -0,10 0,02 -0,02 1,00     
39-AFIC Chart -0,14 -0,25 0,16 0,12 0,02 -0,08 0,14 0,01 0,08 -0,01 -0,03 0,17 1,00    
40-Green or Social fund 0,10 0,07 -0,07 0,06 0,34 0,06 0,02 0,05 -0,03 0,03 0,15 0,06 0,03 1,00   
41-Communication  -0,10 -0,12 0,18 0,16 0,14 0,06 0,06 0,15 -0,16 0,06 0,05 0,37 0,11 0,41 1,00  
42-Interest -0,12 -0,05 0,04 -0,07 0,02 -0,02 -0,05 0,02 0,04 -0,18 0,05 0,38 0,11 0,20 0,29 1,00 
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